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Abstract
We present a novel coalgebraic formulation of infinite extensive games. We define both
the game trees and the strategy profiles by possibly infinite systems of corecursive equations.
Certain strategy profiles are proved to be subgame perfect equilibria using a novel proof
principle of predicate coinduction. We characterize all subgame perfect equilibria for the
dollar auction game. The economically interesting feature is that in order to prove these
results we do not need to rely on continuity assumptions on the payoffs which amount to
discounting the future. In particular, we prove a form of one-deviation principle without
any such assumptions. This suggests that coalgebra supports a more adequate treatment of
infinite-horizon models in game theory and economics.
1 Introduction
Infinite structures turn up at many places in economic theory. Prominent examples are infinite
games. The standard approach is to employ discounted dynamic programming to derive equilibria
[1, 13]. In this paper we take a different approach. We shall use the methods of coalgebra [17, 7]
to analyze two basic examples of infinite games without resorting to discounting and induction.
We use coalgebraic methods to define infinite extensive games and strategy profiles, and the
notion of subgame perfect equilibrium. We then prove that certain profiles are subgame
perfect equilibria. This leads us to formulate an (apparently) novel notion of predicate coinduction,
which is shown to be sound by reducing it to Kozen’s metric coinduction [9]. We give a complete
characterization of the subgame perfect equilibria of the dollar auction game. We also prove a
version of a standard game theoretical result, the one deviation principle, without needing
future discounting assumptions.
Our work is inspired by recent work by Pierre Lescanne [11, 12], but it is explicitly coalge-
braic, leading to a mathematically richer and more general approach. The coalgebraic approach
we present is promising for further applications to economic modeling and we will discuss some
directions for future work in the last section.
For a coalgebraic treatment of combinatorial games, see [4, 5].
2 Games
We shall assume familiarity with the basic elements of coalgebra [17, 7].
We consider possibly infinite games of perfect information in extensive form and fix the fol-
lowing sets:
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• A set A of agents or players. In our examples, we confine ourselves to two-player games,
with A = {A,B}.
• A set C of choices. We restrict our discussion to games where a player has a choice of
two options, left or right, at every stage in the game where it is their turn to play. Thus
C = {l, r}.
• A set U of utility functions, which assign a utility to each player. We take U = RA.
The set of game trees is defined to be (the carrier of) the final coalgebra (G, γ) of the functor
FG : X 7→ U + A×X ×X.
on the category of Set. The game tree is a possibly infinite binary tree. The binary nodes are
labelled with an agent whose turn it is to play at that stage in the game. The nodes have the form
〈α, gl, gr〉,
where α is the agent label, and gl, gr are the subgames corresponding to the left and right choices
respectively. The leaf nodes are labelled with utility functions, representing the pay off for the
game.
2.1 The 0/1 game
We define the utility functions to be
v := [A 7→ 0, B 7→ 1], w := [A 7→ 1, B 7→ 0].
The game is defined by the following pair of mutually corecursive equations:
G = 〈A, v,H〉
H = 〈B,w,G〉.
We can depict the game tree as follows:
A B A B
r r r r
v w v w
l l l l
· · ·
More formally, the above equations define a FG-coalgebra α : {G,H} → FG{G,H} on the set
{G,H}. The 0/1 game is given by JGK, the image of G under the unique coalgebra morphism
J·K : ({G,H}, α) −→ (G, γ)
from ({G,H}, α) to the final coalgebra.
Note that we can read the utility function v as ‘A loses and B wins’, while w corresponds to
‘A wins and B loses’. Thus the player who chooses to stop first loses.
2.2 The dollar auction
The 0/1 game has only finite states; it can be represented by a finite system of equations. The
dollar auction game, a well-known example in game theory, is an infinite-state refinement, where
the utility functions change as we move down the tree.
We fix a real number r, and define utility functions vn, wn for each stage n ∈ N:
vn := [A 7→ −n,B 7→ r − n], wn := [A 7→ r − n,B 7→ −n].
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We define a game by simultaneous corecursion on the infinite set of variables {Gn, Hn | n ∈ N}:
Gn = 〈A, vn, Hn〉
Hn = 〈B,wn, Gn+1〉.
The dollar auction game is again given by JG0K, the image of G0 under the unique coalgebra
morphism into the final coalgebra. We can depict the game tree as follows:
A B A B
r r r r
v0 w0 v1 w1
l l l l
· · ·
The motivation behind this game is as follows [18]. The value of the asset being bid for is r;
in the original example, r is one dollar or 100 cents. The asset goes to the highest bidder, who is
left with a profit of r− b, where b is the value of his highest bid. The loser must also pay the value
of his highest bid, while getting nothing in return. The above definition describes the situation
where each player raises their bid by one cent at each stage in the game. A player either gives
up and finishes the game, conceding the auction to the other player and accepting their loss, or
continues, hoping that the other player will give up. Both players have an incentive to continue
playing well beyond the point where both will make a loss, in order to try to minimize their losses.
3 Strategy profiles
Intuitively, a strategy for a player P of a game G specifies a choice (left or right) for every node of
G at which it is P ’s turn to move. A strategy profile specifies a strategy for every player. Following
[11], we define the set of strategy profiles directly, as the final coalgebra (S, σ) of the functor
FSP : X 7→ U + A× C ×X ×X.
There is an evident natural transformation t : FSP
·
−→ FG defined by projection, which induces a
functor from the category of FSP-coalgebras to the category of FG-coalgebras. It sends a strategy
profile s ∈ S to the underlying game tree game(s) ∈ G. We say that s is a strategy profile for the
game G if G = game(s).
We now define a number of strategy profiles for the 0/1 and dollar auction games.
3.1 The 0/1 game
We define two strategy profiles for the 0/1 game where A always stops (plays left) and B always
continues (plays right), by the following simultaneous corecursion:
AsBc = 〈A, l, v,BcAs〉
BcAs = 〈B, r, w,AsBc〉
We can depict this strategy profile as follows:
A:l B:r A:l B:r
r r r r
v w v w
l l l l
· · ·
Formally, the strategy profile is given by JAsBcK, the image of the strategy profile under the
morphism to the final coalgebra. The strategy profile JAcBsK, where A always continues and B
always stops, is defined symmetrically.
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3.2 The dollar auction
In a similar fashion, we define strategy profiles for the dollar auction by simultaneous corecursion
on an infinite family of variables {AsBcn,BcAsn | n ∈ N}:
AsBcn = 〈A, l, vn,BcAsn〉
BcAsn = 〈B, r, wn,AsBcn+1〉.
Formally, JAsBc0K is a strategy profile for the dollar auction game in which A always stops and B
always continues. The strategy profile JAcBs0K where A always continues and B always stops is
defined symmetrically.
4 Subgame perfect equilibrium
We now show, following [11], how the game-theoretic notion of subgame perfect equilibrium
can be defined coalgebraically. Firstly, we introduce two auxiliary notions.
4.1 Weak and strong convergence
We introduce two predicates on strategy profiles, of weak and strong convergence. A strategy
profile is weakly convergent if following the choices that it specifies from the root eventually leads
to a leaf; it is strongly convergent if this holds in every sub-profile.
We define weak convergence by:
s↓ ⇐⇒ (s = U) ∨ (s = 〈P, l, sl, sr〉 ∧ sl↓) ∨ (s = 〈P, r, sl, sr〉 ∧ sr↓).
More formally, weak convergence is an element of the powerset P(S). It is defined as the least
fixpoint of the monotone function
f↓ : P(S) −→ P(S) :: S 7→ U ∪ {〈P, l, sl, sr〉 | sl ∈ S} ∪ {〈P, r, sl, sr〉 | sr ∈ S}.
Strong convergence is defined as follows:
s⇓ ⇐⇒ (s = U) ∨ (s = 〈P, c, sl, sr〉 ∧ s↓ ∧ sl⇓ ∧ sr⇓).
More formally, it is the greatest fixpoint of the monotone function f⇓ defined analogously to f↓
f⇓ : P(S) −→ P(S) :: S 7→ U ∪ {〈P, l, sl, sr〉 | sl ∈ S, sr ∈ S}.
These fixpoints exist by the Knaster-Tarski fixed point theorem [8, 19].
Note that weak convergence is an inductive notion; the profile must specify a finite path from
the root to a leaf. Thus it is defined as a least fixpoint. Strong convergence, by contrast, expresses
a constraint on all subtrees of an infinite tree, and hence is defined coinductively, as a greatest
fixpoint. The examples of the strategy profiles described in the previous section are all strongly
convergent, as we shall prove in Section 6.
The relationship between the two notions can be nicely characterized in terms of coalgebraic
modal logic [16, 15]. We can define an ‘always’ modality ✷ as an operator on P(S):
s |= ✷φ ≡ s |= φ ∧ s = 〈P, c, sl, sr〉 ⇒ sl |= ✷φ ∧ sr |= ✷φ.
This operator is defined coinductively as a greatest fixpoint. This modality generalizes straighfor-
wardly to any polynomial functor, and can in fact be defined in a much more general way in the
context of coalgebraic modal logic [16, 15]. If we write WC for the weak convergence predicate,
and SC for the strong convergence predicate, we have the following:
Proposition 4.1 SC = ✷WC.
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4.2 Utility functions induced by strategy profiles
A strategy profile s induces a utility function sˆ. This function is defined as follows:
sˆ =


U, s = U
sˆl, s = 〈P, l, sl, sr〉
sˆr, s = 〈P, r, sl, sr〉.
In general, this function may be partial; however, if s is weakly convergent, sˆ is always a well-
defined total function in U .
4.3 Subgame perfect equilibria
We are now ready to define the notion of a strategy profile being a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Firstly, we define a predicate PE on strategy profiles:
PE(s) ⇐⇒ s⇓ ∧ (s = 〈P, l, sl, sr〉 ⇒ sˆl(P ) ≥ sˆr(P )) ∧ (s = 〈P, r, sl, sr〉 ⇒ sˆr(P ) ≥ sˆl(P )).
This predicate is defined explicitly in terms of previous notions; neither induction nor coinduction
is used. It says that the choice at the root for player P results in a better payoff for P than
the other choice would have done. Note that this predicate implies in particular that strong
convergence holds.
We now define the subgame perfect equilibrium predicate SPE on S, coinductively as a greatest
fixpoint.
SPE(s) ⇐⇒ PE(s) ∧ (s = 〈P, c, sl, sr〉 ⇒ SPE(sl) ∧ SPE(sr)).
This says that the PE predicate holds at every node of the tree and we get the following analogue
of Proposition 4.1.
Proposition 4.2 SPE = ✷PE.
The next step is to show that all the strategy profiles discussed in the previous section are in
fact subgame perfect equilibria. In order to do this, we will need to have an appropriate proof
principle in place. This is the topic of the next section.
5 Predicate coinduction
The main emphasis in coinductive proofs has been on proving equations; the main tool for this is
provided by the notion of bisimulation. However, as emphasized e.g. by Kozen [9], the scope of
coinductive methods is broader than this. In our case, we are interested in predicates (properties)
rather than equations. In particular, we wish to show that various elements of the final coalgebra
S satisfy the SPE predicate.
We shall formulate a proof principle which is adequate to carry out these proofs. The principle
is quite general, and applies to any Set-functor T which has a final coalgebra, and is equipped with
a predicate lifting [6], from which a ✷-modality can be defined. Thus it applies in particular to
polynomial functors such as FSP.
Firstly, we need some notation. The final coalgebra of T is denoted (S, σ). Suppose we have a
T -coalgebra (X,α), which we think of as a corecursive system of equations on the set of variables
X . We define a map
α¯ : SX −→ SX :: η 7→ [x 7→ σ−1 ◦ Tη ◦ α(x) ].
Here σ−1 : TS −→ S is the inverse of σ, which is an isomorphism by the Lambek lemma [10].
The following proposition follows directly by unravelling the definitions and applying the final
coalgebra property:
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Proposition 5.1 The map α¯ has a unique fixpoint α¯∗ ∈ SX ; moreover, α¯∗ = J·K, the unique
coalgebra morphism from (X,α) to the final coalgebra.
Now let φ ⊆ S be a predicate on S. We can formulate our predicate coinduction principle as
follows.
∀η ∈ SX . ∀x ∈ X. ∃k ≥ 1. φ(α¯k(η)(x))
∀x ∈ X.✷φ(JxK)
We shall show the soundness of this principle in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2 The predicate coinduction principle is sound.
Proof We can consider the rule as derived by composing two more basic rules. Firstly, from
the premise, we claim that we can derive the following:
∀x ∈ X.φ(JxK).
This holds by taking η = J·K, and noting that, by Proposition 5.1, α¯k(J·K)(x) = JxK.
Since the image of a coalgebra morphism is a sub-coalgebra [17, Theorem 6.3], and hence an
invariant [6, Theorem 6.2.5], and since ✷φ is the largest invariant contained in φ [6, Definition
6.3.1], the conclusion of the rule now follows. 
Simple as it is, this rule is useful since it allows us to derive invariants for elements of the final
coalgebra which are defined by arbitrary systems of corecursive equations. We shall now apply it
to the task of showing that the strategy profiles we have defined are subgame-perfect equilibria.
6 Proving properties for corecursively defined strategy pro-
files
We shall now apply our predicate coinduction principle to show that the strategy profiles defined
in Section 3 are strongly convergent and subgame perfect equilibria.
6.1 The 0/1-game
We shall begin by explicitly computing the depth-three unfoldings of the corecursion variables
AsBc and BcAs. In the notation of the predicate coinduction rule, we are computing α¯k(η)(x) for
k = 3 and x = AsBc, x = BcAs. A straightforward application of the definitions yields:
AsBc(3) = 〈A, l, v, 〈B, r, w, 〈A, l, v, ?〉〉〉, BcAs(3) = 〈B, r, w, 〈A, l, v, 〈B, r, w, ?〉〉〉.
Here we write ? for η(x), since η is arbitrary and we have no information about this value.
A similar computation yields
AcBs(3) = 〈A, r, v, 〈B, l, w, 〈A, r, v, ?〉〉〉, BsAc(3) = 〈B, l, w, 〈A, r, v, 〈B, l, w, ?〉〉〉.
Proposition 6.1 The strategy profiles JAcBsK and JAsBcK are strongly convergent.
Proof We apply the predicate coinduction principle, with k = 2. Using the computations
of AcBs(3) and AsBc(3) given above, we can compute directly that JAcBsK↓ and JBsAcK↓, with
ĴAcBsK = ĴBsAcK = w, and JAsBcK↓ and JBcAsK↓, with ĴAcBsK = ĴBsAcK = v. We conclude that
JAcBsK⇓ and JAsBcK⇓, as required. 
Proposition 6.2 The strategy profiles JAcBsK and JAsBcK are subgame perfect equilibria.
Proof We apply the predicate coinduction principle, with k = 3. For AsBc, we must verify
that AsBc(3) and BcAs(3) are PE. Using the computation of AsBc(3) and BcAs(3) given above, this
reduces to verifying the inequalities
v(A) = 0 ≥ 0 = v(A), v(B) = 1 ≥ 0 = w(B).
The verification that JAcBsK is SPE is similar. 
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6.2 The Dollar Auction
The analysis for the dollar auction will proceed along very similar lines to the 0/1-game.
We begin by computing the depth-three unfoldings of the corecursion variables AsBcn and
BcAsn for all n ≥ 0.
AsBc(3)
n
= 〈A, l, vn, 〈B, r, wn, 〈A, l, vn+1, ?〉〉〉, BcAs
(3) = 〈B, r, wn, 〈A, l, vn+1, 〈B, r, wn+1, ?〉〉〉.
A similar computation yields
AcBs(3)n = 〈A, r, vn, 〈B, l, wn, 〈A, r, vn+1, ?〉〉〉, BsAc
(3) = 〈B, l, wn, 〈A, r, vn+1, 〈B, l, wn+1, ?〉〉〉.
The following result ca now be proved using predicate coinduction, with k = 2, just as for the
0/1 game.
Proposition 6.3 The strategy profiles JAcBs0K and JAsBc0K are strongly convergent.
We recall the parameter r used to define the utility functions vn, wn.
Proposition 6.4 If r ≥ 1, the strategy profiles JAcBsnK and JAsBcnK are subgame perfect equi-
libria for all n.
Proof We apply the predicate coinduction principle, with k = 3. For AsBcn, we must verify
that AsBc(3)n and BcAs
(3)
n are PE for all n. Using the computations of AsBc
(3)
n and BcAs
(3)
n given
above, this reduces to verifying the inequalities
vn(A) = −n ≥ −(n+ 1) = vn+1(A), vn+1(B) = r − (n+ 1) ≥ −n = wn(B).
The latter inequalities are satisfied if and only if r ≥ 1. 
7 The one-deviation principle
We now verify an important property of subgame perfect equilibria: a strategy profile is SPE if and
only if it dominates any profile which differs from it in exactly one choice. In the standard game
theoretical literature [2], this is proved for infinite games only under strong continuity assumptions
on the payoffs, which amount to discounting beyond some finite horizon, thus allowing reduction
to standard backwards induction reasoning. We need no such assumptions.
Given a strategy profile s of the form 〈P, c, sl, sr〉, we say that a profile t for the same game is
a one-deviation from s if t has one of the following forms:
• 〈P, c′, sl, sr〉, where c
′ 6= c.
• 〈P, c, s′
l
, sr〉, where s
′
l
is a one-deviation from sl.
• 〈P, c, sl, s
′
r〉, where s
′
r is a one-deviation from sr.
This is an inductive definition. Given a strategy profile s we define a relation s < t, where t is a
one-deviation of s, inductively as follows:
• If s = 〈P, l, sl, sr〉 and t = 〈P, r, sl, sr〉, then s < t iff sˆl(P ) ≥ sˆr(P )).
• If s = 〈P, r, sl, sr〉 and t = 〈P, l, sl, sr〉, then s < t iff sˆr(P ) ≥ sˆl(P )).
• If s = 〈P, c, sl, sr〉 and t = 〈P, c, s
′
l
, sr〉, then s < t iff sl < s
′
l
.
• If s = 〈P, c, sl, sr〉 and t = 〈P, c, sl, s
′
r〉, then s < t iff sr < s
′
r.
Proposition 7.1 (The one-deviation principle) A strongly convergent strategy profile s is
SPE if and only if for every one-deviation t, s < t.
Proof Firstly, note that if ¬(s < t) for some one-deviation t, this means that some subprofile
of s does not satisfy PE, and since SPE = ✷PE, this implies that s does not satisfy SPE. For the
converse, note that if for some one-deviation t, s < t, this implies that the sub-profile of s whose
root is at the node where t differs from s satisfies PE. If this holds for all one-deviations, then all
sub-profiles of s satisfy PE, and hence s satisfies SPE. 
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8 Complete Characterization of SPE for the Dollar Auction
We can give a complete characterization of the subgame perfect equilibria for the dollar auction
game.
Theorem 8.1 A strategy profile for the dollar auction game is SPE if and only if it is of the
form AsBc or A always stops and B always continues or symmetrically AcBs or B always stops
and A always continues.
Proof Firstly, note that if both players always continue from some point in the game, the profile
will not be strongly convergent. Now suppose that both players choose to stop at some nodes of
the game. Then there must be some node ν where player α chooses to stop, such that the next
player choosing to stop is the other player. But then ν is not in PE, since α could improve his
payoff from that node by choosing to continue. Thus one player must always continue in any SPE
profile, while the other player α must stop infinitely often. Finally, α must in fact always choose to
stop, since otherwise he could improve his payoff from any node where he chooses to continue. 
This analysis applies to any game sharing the following features of the dollar auction game:
1. At any point of the game, it is always better for a given player if the other player stops first.
2. At any point of the game, it is (strictly) better for the player who is the first to stop from
that point to stop immediately rather than later.
As a final remark on the dollar auction game, we note that Lescanne proposes to use this
form of analysis to explain the rationality of infinite escalation [11]. If we don’t know which
strategy the other player is following, we always have an incentive to continue! However, by our
characterization result, after one round where both players choose to continue, they both know
they are not in an SPE — and all bets are off! Thus it seems to us that a comprehensive
analysis of escalation should use a refined model with an explicit representation of the beliefs of
the players, as in Harsanyi type spaces [3] — which can also be modelled coalgebraically [14].
9 Further Directions
The present paper contains what should be regarded as some very preliminary results, presented in
a manner which is mainly aimed at computer scientists and mathematicians rather than economists
and game theorists. Nevertheless, in our view the general idea of applying coalgebraic and other
structural methods which have been developed in computer science to economics and game theory
is promising, and deserves further study and development. In particular, many topics in economics
which refer to infinite horizons and reflexivity seem tailor-made for the use of coalgebraic methods.
At the same time, they can suggest new challenges and technical directions for coalgebra.
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